While Taiwan's democratization and China's continuing authoritarianism have often been attributed to the decisions of their leaders, might there, instead, be external factors which have ensured that these two polities would have walked along more or less the same route that they have so far, regardless of who their rulers are? Questions as such make for a good basis of comparison between the two states and may offer a deeper insight into the facets of democracy and authoritarianism. Without contesting the relevance of other factors in influencing these two states' political trajectories, this paper explores and evaluates the two most popular sets of factors -economic factors related to the modernization theory and those from the international environment including impacts from abroad on regime security and on domestic dissident movements -which have been put forward to explain Taiwan's democratization versus China's continuing authoritarianism.
Introduction
On September 1, 1996, an article titled "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy" was published in the The National Interest journal. The article starts off with the intriguing lines, "When will China become a democracy? The answer is around the year 2015. Some might think such a prediction foolhardy but it is based on developments on several fronts, ones inadequately reported in the American media." Five years later, Henry Rowen, author of
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Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Si-Ning Yeoh the aforementioned article, revised the deadline for China's crossing the democracy threshold to 2020. Two years after that, he revised it further to predict that China 1 would join the ranks of "free" countries by 2025.
For many, these predictions may appear truly "foolhardy". Note, however, that Rowen is not the only one making such prognostications; the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 2 has been repeatedly prophesied by various academics over the past decades. Other recent prophecies include Shaohua Hu's Explaining Chinese Democratization (2000) , which foretold that China's transition to democracy would transpire by 2011, a target which has clearly not been achieved. Like Rowen, Bruce Gilley's China's Democratic Future (2004) argued that the possibilities of China democratizing before 2020 were high; similarly, Yu Liu's and Dingding Chen's "Why China Will Democratize" (2012) predicted that China would "embark upon democratization around 2020". Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy (2005) projected China's democratic breakthrough to occur within the encouraging time period of the next two decades, while Will Hutton's 2012 article in The Observer postulated that "A Chinese spring is now very likely sometime in the next 10 years".
Reading these claims, one might be led to assume that China is teetering on the brink of revolution. Thus far, however, China has seemingly resisted the waves of democratization which have swept through the globe. The question that must be asked, hence, is: how? What factors have sustained China's authoritarianism until today, in spite of the various factors which the aforementioned authors had identified in their works which render democratization a distinct possibility? It is with this question in mind that one might turn to a particular island off the southeastern coast of China for answers. Democratic Taiwan 臺灣, officially the Republic of China (ROC, 中華民國), stands in intriguing, defiant contrast to China as the road not taken. Her ruling regime, the Kuomintang 國民黨 (KMT) 3 , shared much of the same history and culture with the CCP, in that both parties were birthed from the same turbulent, revolutionary political conditions which had swept through early-twentieth-century China (Diamond, 2008) . Indeed, they had even allied together for a time to form the First United Front in their efforts to eradicate warlordism from China. When ideological cleavage between these two parties led to the Chinese Civil War and the ROC government's defeat, then-KMT leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 retreated with a significant amount of gold and approximately 2 million Nationalist refugees to the small island of Taiwan where he established a hard-line authoritarian regime, while then-CCP leader Mao Zedong 毛泽东 took control of mainland China and set up a brutal dictatorship. Both leaders were responsible for appalling excesses of power: following the 228 Massacre of 1947 (二二八 大屠殺), Taiwan was consigned to the White Terror (白色恐怖), one of the Taiwan and Mainland China: Political Trajectory in Comparative Perspective 365 longest martial law periods in world history. Under the grim eye of the Taiwan Garrison Command secret police body, tens of thousands of Taiwanese were imprisoned and executed. China, in the meantime, suffered through the Great Chinese Famine and the Cultural Revolution, in which millions of Chinese died through starvation, suicides and executions. In the wake of Mao Zedong's and Chiang Kai-shek's deaths in the mid-1970s, however, Taiwan's subsequent leaders have carved out a drastically dissimilar pathway from that of China's. While Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 and his successors have leashed China firmly to the authoritarian end of the political spectrum, Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 and Taiwan's ensuing leaders have successfully facilitated a bloodless and relatively peaceful democratic transition by imposition for their nation. 4 With this state of affairs, it is tempting to entertain a number of whatif scenarios: What would have happened if roles had been switched and the KMT, rather than the CCP, had won the Chinese Civil War? Would China then have followed a democratic trajectory like that of Taiwan while Taiwan followed an authoritarian trajectory like that of China? Or is it overly simplistic and naïve to attribute Taiwan's democratization and China's continuing authoritarianism to the decisions of their leaders -might there, instead, be external factors which have ensured that the two countries would have walked along more or less the same route that they have so far, regardless of who their rulers are? As various political analysts have found, these questions make for a good basis of comparison between the two states and may offer a deeper insight into the facets of democracy and authoritarianism. There is thus a rich treasure trove of literature on this subject. Without contesting the relevance of other factors in influencing these two states' political trajectories, this paper will explore and evaluate the two most popular sets of factors which have been put forward to explain Taiwan's democratization versus China's continuing authoritarianism.
Economic Factors
Out of all the models which have been identified to explain China's and Taiwan's distinct political trajectories, the modernization theory is arguably the most hotly debated in contemporary academic literature. This theory is an endogenous model which postulates a link between the "economic development complex" (i.e. factors related to economic development, such as industrialization, urbanization, education, and wealth) and democracy (Lipset, 1959) . The simplest and earliest version of it argues that the more a(n authoritarian) country modernizes, the more a "state of mind" favourable to liberalization is promoted within her, and thus, the higher her chances are of democratizing. This theory has frequently come under heavy attack due to its multiple issues with Western-centrism as well as oversimplification of the
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Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Si-Ning Yeoh process of social and political change, but time and time again, it invariably persists in making comebacks into the academic spotlight, albeit in modified forms. The theory's inescapable attraction is that, despite its inability to function as the one-size-fits-all explanation for how countries work which earlier modernization theorists had anticipated that it would, it does still serve as the key to understanding the development of a large number of politically and economically significant countries.
Taiwan is one such state whose development functions as a perfect textbook validation of the modernization theory, for she has proven to be one of the most successful later industrializers in the history of the twentieth century as well as a "best-case" democracy (Rigger, 2004) . The pre-conditions for Taiwan's modern economic growth were initiated before the KMT's arrival upon her soil and are highly distinguishable from that of Mainland China's. Prior to the First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was a peripheral province of the Ch'ing 清 (Qing) dynasty and played a somewhat negligible role in the Chinese economy. With the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki (Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約 / Ma Kuan T'iao Yüeh 馬關條約), however, Taiwan was ceded to Japanese control for approximately the next half century and came into the limelight as Japan's first overseas colony. Intending to "prove that Japan could out-colonize those who might dream of colonizing Japan", the colonizer worked to shape Taiwan into a "model colony" capable of rivaling those of Japan's Western counterparts, and so instituted a form of 'developmental colonialism' via investing much effort and resources towards upgrading the island's industry, infrastructure, education, agriculture, sanitation, etc. (Rigger, 1999) . Although she was kept on a tight leash to prevent the potential flowering of political dissent 5 , the benefits that Taiwan reaped from living "through half a century in a highly developed industrial capitalism" were highly significant (Wang, 1946: 7) . As can be seen in Table 1 , Taiwan's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate dramatically outperformed that of China's during the period of Japanese rule (Cha and Wu, 2002) . Thus, at the culmination of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan was superior to Taiwan  -560  701  1175  1236  China  540  547  552  578  589  Japan  1012  1193  1385  2122  2449 Source: Cha and Wu (2002) . Taiwan and Mainland China: Political Trajectory in Comparative Perspective 367 China in terms of her better infrastructure, better health, higher educational attainment, and higher industrialization, albeit still lacking in democracy and local leadership initiative. Taiwan's GDP suffered a dramatic drop during the turbulent years of World War II due to American bombardment and the exploitation of its resources to fuel the Japanese war machine (Leng, 1993) . The solid foundation for economic development which Japan had laid down, however, stood Taiwan in good stead, and so the damages Taiwan had incurred were gradually alleviated over time. Recognizing the mistakes made which had led to the fall of the KMT in China, Chiang Kai-shek decided to change their approach in handling the economy in Taiwan and so, with the support of massive United States (US) aid programmes, he introduced capitalistic institutions to the region in the form of free enterprise, land reform, small businesses and sound monetary policies. Thus, while the political system still remained firmly under an authoritarian thumb, the economic system was given leeway to flourish on its own. This decision proved truly pivotal, for, it led to a growth spurt even steeper than that enjoyed by Taiwan during Japanese rule (Cha and Wu, 2002) . By 1965, Taiwan's economy was able to become self-sustaining enough that she no longer needed nor wanted the US economic aid that she had previously received (Maclay, 1997) . Thus, when Chiang Ching-kuo came into power in the 70s, he was taking command of a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing Taiwan, whose increasingly educated and politically conscious people had begun to chafe under the repressive yoke of the hard-line authoritarian policies since Chiang Kai-shek's era.
It is at this point that the predictions of the modernization theory begin to appear validated, as can be seen from the events which followed. Local elections were held in an effort to increase the political participation of the native Taiwanese. Four new members, all of whom were highly educated and had no significant connections to the military or the Chiang family, were elected to the KMT's top decision-making body, i.e. the Central Standing Committee in 1986 (Copper, 1987) . Most importantly, the KMT convened with intellectuals and opposition leaders in discussions which eventually led to the end of martial law and the formation of a major national opposition party, i.e. the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In short, many governmental reforms were launched which enabled the system to transition gradually away from hard-line authoritarianism to partial democratization 6 . These liberalizing measures not only involved the political realm, but fed back into the economic one as well. As can be seen from Figure 1, Taiwan's economic freedom has steadily increased since 1975, i.e. the year Chiang Ching-kuo fully came to power. This has paid off well, as can be seen when referring back to Cha and Wu (2002) cited above. Thus, in 1986, Taiwan was credited as the top nation throughout the globe in terms of economic performance (Copper, 1987) , and when Chiang Ching-kuo's successor, the native Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui 李登 輝, came onto the scene in 1988, modernized Taiwan was ready for his efforts to facilitate her evolution into a full-fledged constitutional democracy. While Taiwan's political and economic trajectory sits easily within the contours of the modernization theory, China's case is much less clear-cut, for China did not fare as well as Taiwan in terms of economic growth and stability for the better part of a century. After her 1895 defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the First Sino-Japanese War, China had to deal with, in rapid succession, the Coup of 1898, the 1900 Boxer rebellion, the Hsin-hai (Xinhai) Revolution (辛亥革命) of 1911, the decade-long Warlord Era starting in 1916, and the 1927-50 Chinese Civil War. The KMT's later success in managing Taiwan's economy came at the cost of much economic mismanagement during their reign in China, which was afflicted with rapid hyper-inflation, governmental inefficiencies and widespread corruption 7 . The situation only worsened with Mao Zedong's subsequent governance, which was characterized by a chaotic, deadly devastation of life and society due to Mao Figure 1 Taiwan and China: Economic Freedom (Chain-Linked Summary Index, 1970-2010) Source: Kasper (2013) , from Gwartney, Lawson and Hall (2012: 18-21) (Naughton, 1993) . Like his contemporary Taiwanese counterpart, Chiang Ching-kuo, his actions were constructive in facilitating the level of economic freedom within the country, as Naughton notes, Deng has been willing to adopt policies of non-intervention. He has allowed economic (but not political) developments to unfold without constant interference from the Party or government […] Deng has displayed a personal talent for laissez-faire: he has mastered the ruler's art of non-acting.
This, coupled with a new emphasis on opening China to the outside world, the adoption of the Four Modernization goals, and various other economic reforms, was pivotal in reviving China's stagnated economy and bringing her back onto the path of modernization. Since then, her economic performance has been nothing short of an extraordinary success story. Propelling herself upwards dramatically upon the back of an enormous economic boom, China can today take her pride of place upon the world map as an emerging superpower potentially capable of rivaling other hegemonic forces today. What is truly fascinating, however, is the apparent ability of the Chinese government to engender such impressive economic growth without having given up its authoritarian grip over the country. Over the years, the troubling incident of the 1989 Beijing-Tiananmen massacre 8 , the persecution, incarceration, torture, exile and re-education through labour of political dissidents at various points in time, the 2011 crackdown on pro-democracy protests and many more have shown that democracy is unlikely to come as peacefully to China as it did to Taiwan, if it comes at all. Much discussion has centred on unpacking her intriguing model of economic freedom and political repression, as its existence appears to go against the conventional wisdom that liberalizing economic and political reforms must go hand in hand -which is incidentally also the conventional wisdom of the modernization theory. The conclusions drawn from these discussions can vary tremendously, as will be elaborated upon below. Meanwhile, Womack (2012) notes the contradiction while highlighting the role of the peculiar domestic governance characteristics in its explanation:
[…] the failure of leftism in China and Vietnam and the subsequent success of reform and openness raise the question of the essence of modernization. They tried and failed to take a different road, and yet their present and foreseeable paths of modernization are quite different from parliamentary states. Market forces now operate within self-restrained party-states, and even administrative rewards are primarily contingent on economic growth.
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Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Si-Ning Yeoh Shanghai has again become a Weltstadt, more like other cities of its rank than like the rural hinterland that supplies its internal immigrant labour force. There is a convergence of domestic governance issues and policies that is not painted onto China from the outside by globalization but rather is emerging from the greater sophistication and diversity of its own society. (Womack, 2011: 165) One interesting argument that has been posited is that the modernization theory may still be compatible with the China model if one takes into consideration the theory's foundational assumption that modernization occurs as a linear process which can be divided into a series of stages. With that in mind, one might regard China as having not yet achieved the political liberalization that the modernization theory anticipates she should because she has not yet modernized enough, and so the contemporary China model resides in the penultimate phase of the modernization process rather than in the final phase. In terms of the Rostovian take-off developmental model, for example, it may be reasoned that China is currently experiencing the "drive to maturity", i.e. the fourth stage of economic growth, and will, in time, eventually reach the end point of the "age of high mass consumption" that other more developed and democratic countries are currently enjoying. In short, modernization has occurred in China; democratization will arguably follow with sufficient patience.
This particular idea has enjoyed long-standing influence with the Chinese government, who has emphasized time and again that China is not yet ready for democracy due to the "feudal culture" of the people. Related to this is the policy justification based on the perception of the level of suzhi:
In the analysis of deeply embedded concepts such as suzhi 素质 (human quality), for example, we see that the terrain of government has widened considerably and that not all citizens (or we might say "citizen-subjects" to capture the dual sense of autonomy and heteronomy implied here) are treated equally. In terms of the discourse of suzhi, for example, some are seen to possess the attributes of "high quality" (gao suzhi 高素质) and are thereby able to govern themselves, whilst others are in the "low quality" (di suzhi 低素质) category and in need of "self-improvement" […] government is much more than the act of policy formation and implementation but just as equally about the formation of conceptual categories of "the governors" and "the governed". (Sigley, 2013: 180-181) In a CBS interview in September 2000, for example, then-president Jiang Zemin 江泽民 had shown his disagreement with the Chinese people's "fitness for democracy" through the provocative statement that "The quality of our people is too low", and thus it is unwise for any person to attempt to hurry up the process of liberalization (Li, 2004) . Ultimately, however, it is difficult to take the CCP's claim seriously, as the regime's stake in the political situation of China makes it all too likely that this argument is mere obfuscation to respond to critics asserting that the true obstacle to democracy is the government itself. Fortunately, academic discussion provides rather more thought-provoking arguments to make their case. In a 2008 article "Comparing and Rethinking Political Change in Taiwan", for example, China specialist Bruce Gilley addresses the methodological consideration of periodization, i.e. comparing like periods. As has been chronicled above, Taiwan's economic development had started earlier and enjoyed much more stability than that of China. Furthermore, Taiwan being the manifestation of a "best-case" democratization that she is indicates that her political trajectory is not the norm; in fact, Taiwan may be seen as experiencing a uniquely early democratic transition as compared to other countries. Thus, Gilley argues that it is unfair to compare modern Taiwan to modern China; instead, by imposing a 26-year lag on China, one might see that the 2003 income level of China is equivalent to Taiwan's 1977 income level and thus, still far off from the income level which Taiwan had when the she achieved her 1986 democratic breakthrough. Taking into consideration the fact that Taiwan's democratic transition is assumed to have occurred earlier than the norm, this figure implies that the earliest possible date for China's democratic transition is 2013, and thus, it is unrealistic for critics to expect that China should have democratized in previous decades. Another relevant argument in academic literature which ties the China model neatly into the modernization theory is the analysis of noted academics Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, who had put forward a more nuanced version of the said theory. In their work "Modernization: Theories and Facts" (1997), Przeworski and Limongi contended that an increase in economic modernization, and thus an increase in the per capita income of a country increases the possibility of a democratic transition to occur, but only until the per capita income of the said country reaches US$6000. Above that level, authoritarian governments grow stronger and the possibility of the country's democratic transition becomes weaker as per capita income increases. The explanation they put forward for this phenomenon is as follows:
The intuitive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the distribution of income choose between complying with the verdicts of democratic competition, in which case each can expect to get some share of total income, or risking a fight over dictatorship, which is costly but which gives the victor all of the income. Now suppose that the marginal utility of consumption is lower at higher levels of consumption. Thus the gain from winning the struggle for dictatorship is smaller. In turn, if the production function has diminishing marginal returns in capital stock, the "catch-up" from destroying a part of it during the war for dictatorship is faster at lower levels of wealth. Hence, in poor countries the value of becoming a dictator is greater and the accumulated cost of destroying capital stock is lower. In wealthy countries, by contrast, the gain from getting all rather than a part of total income is smaller and the recuperation from destruction is slower. Hence, struggle for dictatorship is more attractive in poorer countries.
Through this, one may conclude that modernization appears to have a push and pull relationship with regime dominance; below the GDP level identified by Przeworski and Limongi, the push between modernization and authoritarianism is stronger, but past it, the pull prevails. China, thus, has arguably moved past that critical level of economic development at which modernization would play an important role in her transition to democracy. This suggests that should she democratize in the future, such an event should be credited to other factors which have successfully overcome the pull relationship aforementioned, instead of being viewed as mainly an achievement of modernization.
While all the arguments above function in such a way as to render the modernization theory compliant with the China model, the implications they hold for China's future could not have been more different. Interpretations of the China model using Przeworski's and Limongi's argument will prove less welcome to democratization proponents than interpretations using the argument that China just has not modernized enough, as the latter implies that the economic growth currently progressing will result in a higher chance for democracy to come to fruition, but the former suggests that economic growth will instead act as an obstacle to that eventuality. Despite its pessimism, however, Przeworski and Limongi's analysis has an advantage over the others in that it deals with a glaring flaw of the basic modernization theory. While the modernization factor may be used to explain the fall of KMT authoritarianism as shown above, on the flip side, it can also provide equally compelling evidence for explaining the CCP's continued dominance, for China's economic growth has been identified in both academic and popular discussion as a main factor in consolidating the CCP's "performance legitimacy".
The CCP has faced many challenges ever since it began its reign of power; the disillusionment of the populace with the regime due to the Great Chinese Famine, for example, as well as the anger and turmoil which came about as a result of the 1989 Beijing massacre mark the big milestones in the CCP's struggles for legitimacy. In recent years, the threats to their authority have grown much less dramatic, though no less insidious -much academic discussion has centred around how popular discontent caused by contemporary issues like burgeoning corruption, environmental destruction and deepening economic inequalities are threatening the party's power. Despite all this, however, most academic measurements have found that the CCP enjoyed consistently high legitimacy levels. Gilley's 2006 legitimacy index, for example, ranks China as the top 13th out of 72 states in terms of legitimacy scores, right upon the heels of Taiwan in the 12th place and beating out countries like Switzerland, New Zealand and South Korea (Gilley, 2006) 9 .
In a time when a trend of declining public trust is found throughout the world, especially in the wake of the recent financial crisis, Chinese confidence in the CCP is still one of the highest to be found relative to other countries, as can be derived from analyzing the Edelman's Trust measurements (2012 Edelman Trust Barometer) . It comes as quite the ironic revelation that this high legitimacy is widely attributed to the CCP's purported success at bringing modernization to the country. Since the failure of Mao Zedong's communist ideology in serving as a valid source of legitimacy, the CCP has pragmatically turned to focus on economic performance to justify its rule. 10 This redefinition of the public interest has proven to be a masterful move; as one may note from, for example, the data gathered by the 2007 World Values Survey, a high level of economic growth is by far the most important national goal as considered by the Chinese populace, and so the development of China into the economically dominant country that she is today has been viewed with much pride and nationalistic sentiment. Thus, actions which would challenge the government's authoritarian grip, such as the fight for political freedom, must take a back seat, as they are considered highly likely to destabilize the economy as well. Such a stance is reflected in the works of academics such as Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson 11 (as cited in Przeworski, 1997) , who argue that "political participation must be held down, at least temporarily, in order to promote economic development."
The modernization theory thus makes a highly convincing case for explaining Taiwan's democratization and is not completely incompatible with the realities of China's current authoritarianism. However, "not completely incompatible" is a lukewarm sentiment at best. Sadly, there is no way of concretely confirming the relevance of the modernization theory until a democratic transition occurs, and therein lies one of said theory's biggest problem -it is a model best applied in looking at a nation's democratization in hindsight. Contrary to the assertions of its proponents, the modernization theory's predictive power can hold no claim to be better than that of competing theories 12 . In short, the modernization factor is not an ideal basis of comparison for Taiwan and China.
International Environment
No country exists in a vacuum; the consequences of the smallest decisions or actions generated through global interactions can affect a country's trajectory dramatically. It is hence impossible to analyze modern-day Taiwan and China without touching upon the critical role that the international environment has played in impacting their history, especially in the wake of the Chinese Civil War.
Twist of Fate in International Standing
The defeat of the Nationalist army by the Communists in 1950 had been keenly felt as a blow to the anti-communist portion of the international community. Critics howled that then-US President Harry Truman had failed to provide sufficient support to their Free China allies and as a result, the US was presumed responsible for "losing" China to "the Reds". Such a proportioning of blame had the indirect effect of heightening international sympathy for the KMT regime. Thus, when the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1950, it did so with the consoling knowledge that it still possessed powerful allies which recognized the ROC as the true government of all China and opposed the dominance of the CCP over the mainland.
Many pessimistic predictions were made forecasting Taiwan's eventual fall to the mainland's control. Recognizing the high costs of directly engaging the CCP army in combat, the international community was reluctant to furnish Taiwan with offensive support or directly assist the KMT's quest to recover China. Even so, "there were few spokesmen, even in neutralist countries, who […] advocated turning Taiwan over to the Communists" and thus the international community willingly provided defensive support instead (Walker, 1959) . The US, as previously mentioned, proved to be a particularly valuable ally in that it provided both military aid in the form of stationing the US Navy's Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait and economic aid in the form of "Development Loans" to finance new economic projects which must be approved by the US government; "Development Grants" to provide technical assistance against obstacles to economic development; and farm surplus commodities under "Public Law 480" (Chang, 1965) . Simultaneously, the US built up a bitter enmity with China, whose switch to communism and involvement in the 1950 Korean War were regarded as personal affronts, while Washington "took a hard line by toughening the US economic embargo against the PRC, […] firming up support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan [and] blocking the PRC's membership in the UN, and further isolating the PRC politically" (Xia, 2008) . All this, alongside the problems of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet alliance as well as internal instability in China, served to weaken China's strategic position against that of Taiwan's within the global arena for a time. In short, it would not be amiss to conclude that the KMT's survival in Taiwan subsequent to the Civil War was more an indicator of the tremendous sway Western and US opinion and actions had over international politics than a testament to the KMT's own strength.
As the years passed, however, the international community inevitably realized the unlikelihood of the ROC ever returning to the mainland and re-assuming the status of a world power. Slowly but surely, pragmatism won over idealism, and the balance of power gradually tipped in favour of the PRC. A key character expediting the erosion of Taiwan's international standing was, in an ironic twist of fate, none other than then-President of the US, Richard Nixon. Prior to 1970, Nixon had been appreciated as one of Taipei's favourite American allies, given his past reputation as a formidable "red-baiter". This, however, changed when the Nixon administration enacted a grand plan to restructure the international order via initiating a strategy of triangular diplomacy to create a state of détente between China, the Soviet Union and the US. This strategy achieved its intended sub-goal of normalizing US relations with the PRC, but simultaneously, it effectively sidelined the ROC government and served as a harbinger of the derecognition to come. On 25th October 1971, the United Nations made the momentous decision to "expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang K'ai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nation" and accepted the PRC as the legitimate government of China (Appleton, 1972) .
The significance of this decision cannot be understated. Not only did China gain all the international legitimacy which Taiwan lost, she also secured much more leverage and a better bargaining position than Taiwan could ever have hoped to hold. Owing to the disparities of size and geography between the two regions, Mainland China has always played a more critical role in the annals of world history as compared to Taiwan and, regardless of the international environment, shown that she is a player not to be trifled with. International support for Taiwan involved less potential risk but also less potential reward than international support for China, as may be derived from current conditions -even if the global community had continued to support the former rather than the latter, it is difficult to imagine Taiwan becoming the economic powerhouse and regional leader that China is today.
Thus, with the fateful 1971 verdict, Taiwan was demoted to becoming a political entity in possession of virtually all the trappings of a country, save for the vital last ingredient -formal recognition from other countries. She could only be seen as an object of trade and tourism in the global mind, as "the People's Republic of China (PRC) [...] made it clear that it [did] not object to European business activity in Taiwan if political overtones are excluded" (Drifte, 1985) . This was a precariously vulnerable position for any country to have, and it was to Taiwan's credit that their reaction "was not only controlled, but somewhat more receptive than usual to suggestions for internal reform", as Appleton (1972) noted, "Observers on Taiwan when the Nixon trip to Peking and the U.N. China vote were announced reported concern, but no depression, panic or major demonstrations". Something, however, clearly needed to be done if Taiwan intended to retain her governmental autonomy.
China, in the meantime, has never been under such pressure to democratize. Although she has frequently come under media fire for her consistently violent stance against any form of political dissent within the country, the international repercussions which followed have not as punishing to the China government as they could have been, and certainly resulted in nothing as damaging as the precariously isolated position that Taiwan had found herself in. After the Beijing massacre of 1989, for example, many Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations had expressed their disapproval of the CCP government's violent actions via imposing economic sanctions which banned the transfer of high technology and governmental loans. These sanctions, however, lasted a paltry two years; by the mid-1990s, most international relations had warmed up to China once more.
International Factors in the Development of Dissident Movements and Democratization in Taiwan and Mainland China
In Taiwan, the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party on 28th September 1986 in defiance of restrictions imposed by the authoritarian KMT regime represented a watershed in Taiwan's gradually moving from an authoritarian political structure towards today's full-fledged multiparty electoral democratic system. While we have observed earlier that Taiwan's trajectory of democratization seems more or less to vindicate the modernization theory, the obvious delay has sometimes been seen as a puzzle as the socioeconomic prerequisites of democracy that the modernization theory has posited had long already existed by the 1970s, about a decade after the Lei Chen Incident that spelt the end of the first wave of Taiwanese democratization. If we could compare the 1960's "judgment without trial" on General Lei Chen 雷震 (founder of the Free China semimonthly with support by Hu Shih 胡適 and other prominent intellectuals of Taiwan, with accusations of rebellion, which was revealed in Hsieh Han-lu's 2002 firsthand exposé as the result of a direct order from then-president Chiang Kai-shek) with the arrest and sentencing of Wei Jingsheng 魏京生 (who put up his manifesto "The Fifth Modernization" -i.e. democracy, in addition to the pursuit of the "Four Modernizations" of China's agricultural, industrial, national defense and science sectors declared by Deng Xiaoping -on the "Democracy Wall") in 1978, bearing in mind Gilley's concept of a time lag referred to earlier, some understanding could probably be gained as regard to the different outcomes that transpired in Taiwan and Mainland China when the "third wave of democracy" (à la Huntington, 1991 Huntington, , 1993 struck in the late 1980s.
Complementing his view of ethnicity as a special case of stratification, an analytical perspective concerned with conflict and power (the Weberian approach), Katznelson (1971: 69-70) emphasized the importance of the notion of "critical structural periods" -historical periods when "critical structural decisions" are made. Citing Schattschneider's remark that "organization is the mobilization of bias" (1961: 71), Katznelson noted that critical structural decisions are those that define the "structured relationships" which not only limit but also shape the direction of behavioural choice. In other words, social time rather than historical time, which can be misleading, is the crucial variable, bearing in mind Levi-Strauss's perception of time not solely in mechanical, cumulative or statistical terms, but also in social terms -deriving its properties from concrete social phenomena (Levi-Strauss, 1967: 281-283) .
While at the critical juncture of 1989 as Tiananmen Square's student demonstrations, originally against official corruption and State ineptitude, evolved into the broad-based 100-day pro-democracy movement after being joined in by other demonstrators from all walks of life from Beijing to Hong Kong, from Chengdu to Shenzhen, tragically ended up with a besieged regime finally responding with a massacre to reclaim the capital from the unarmed peaceful protesters on that fateful night of June 3rd-4th, 1989, across the Taiwan Strait democratization was moving apace. Under the new presidency of native Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui who succeeded Chiang Chingkuo who passed away in January 1988, early in 1989 the passing of the Civil Organizations Law legalizing opposition political parties (and subsequently a lifting of restrictions on campaigning activities) represented a new watershed event since Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and virtually ended authoritarianism in Taiwan on 15th July 1987, and this was followed by the holding of elections in December 1989 with the newly legalized opposition Democratic Progressive Party capturing 31 per cent of the Legislative Yuan.
Developments in subsequent years further accentuated the contrast between Taiwan consolidating its democratization and strengthening its democratic institutions, making it a full-fledged human rights-respecting free society, and Mainland China continued to cruise along with political repression and relentless proscription of political dissent -a stark contrast in trajectory that we have scrutinized from several perspectives earlier in this paper. Free from effective pressure and censure, as shown in the stylized representation in Figure 2 , continued proscription of even the slightest manifestation of dissent against the one-party rule has managed to contain societal political action to the routine intra-party politics at the far bottom right-hand corner, despite the sporadic outbursts of people power usually stemming from localized grievances which have always been quickly suppressed. Amidst all this, as a contrast to the case of Taiwanese democratization, individual political actors domestic and foreign are playing a central role in giving existence to the obduracy of the system, for the causal powers of systems and structures cannot exist without the mediation through the human agency, as Margaret Archer admitted despite her rejection of the theorem of the duality of agency and structure (Archer, 2003) .
However, as the Orwellian extent of suppression against political dissidents and civil rights activists, including the high-profiles cases of Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚, Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 and Hu Jia 胡佳 and many other less well-known but even more heart-rending cases like the indomitable Li Wangyang 李旺阳 13 , continue to position Mainland China in stark contrast against Taiwan's successful democratization, factors that affect the effectiveness of dissident movements are set to deserve due attention.
As we have observed earlier in the paper, Taiwan's particular international circumstances (vis-à-vis China's) were significant to its democratic development. The successful democratization of Taiwan has been significantly attributed to the Republic of China's loss of her seat in the United Nations in 1971 -being replaced by the People's Republic of China -followed by her 
Degree of institutionalization/ routinization
Degree of organization Degree of targeted change Revolution (ROC, 1911; PRC, 1949) Rebellion (Tibet, 1959) Collective action (Tiananmen demonstrations, 1989) Social movement (May Fourth Movement, 1919) Political and economic reform (PRC's economic reform since 1978, intra-Party political reform; Taiwan's democratization, 1987 Taiwan's democratization, , 1989 Taiwan's democratization, , 1996 ) Lobbying Routine politics marginalization in the Senkaku/Tiaoyutai (尖閣諸島/釣魚台列嶼) 14 dispute, and adding insult to injury, the 1979 US derecognition. This sequence of humiliating events has been argued to have triggered an unprecedented, major national crisis 15 , though Chu (1992) also brought in the decline in military tension with Mainland China in the late 1970s as a factor given that the said decline has greatly reduced the "siege mentality" of the Taiwanese people and in turn the legitimacy of a continuing authoritarian polity. All these had irreparably weakened the KMT's moral stance in maintaining an authoritarian grip upon the island state. Similar circumstance has occurred in Argentina as result of losing the war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).
On the contrary, such circumstances did not materialize in the case of Mainland China, even though for a short moment it looked like a genuine possibility to some international observers in the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Beijing massacre. While Asiaweek in its 16th June 1989 editorial "The Rape of Peking" lamented a Goya-esque landscape 16 , the editorial seem today, by hindsight, a gross underestimation of CCP's resiliency and the effectiveness of authoritarian power, given the stark asymmetry in power relations and one-sided monopoly of violence. The reality was: building upon the foundation set by the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang administration's audacious reformist programmes, Deng Xiaoping moved forward from where his purged former protégés have left by reinvigorating the post-Tiananmen chilling politico-economic milieu through his nanxun 南巡 ("southern tour") in 1992, culminating lately in China first superseding Germany to become the world's third largest economy in early 2008, ranked only after the US and Japan, and finally superseding Japan in mid-2010. 17 While Taiwan's KMT leadership might be under pressure to curry the favour of the international community (Nathan and Ho, 1993) , given the abovementioned national crisis the island state was experiencing, circumstances seemed to be the opposite in the case of Mainland China's CCP, which is characterized by "the complicity in [the Chinese repression of dissent] of outsiders from sports organizations and personages and musical and film celebrities anxious to enter the new entertainment market to educational institutions that serve willingly as vehicles for state guided propaganda through the so-called 'Confucius Institutes', and mimic corporations in the joint educational enterprises they establish" in China while above all "are transnational corporations that not only bank their futures on the China market but ideologically condone repression in their enthusiasm for the authoritarian 'China model'." (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 285) Amidst such atmosphere of international acquiescence and appeasement, […] criticism of the PRC seems perfunctory when compared to threats of embargoes and wars against comparable dictatorial regimes. Power relations, economic interests, and a long standing culturalist fascination with China combine to set China apart from other such regimes. Indeed, there has been an ongoing celebration of the PRC's development under the leadership of the Communist Party that recalls memories of the Chinoiserie that took Europe by storm three centuries ago. There are even displays of willingness to complicity with the regime's pursuit of global hegemony, most notoriously through the so-called Confucius Institutes. Not only governments and business but even educational institutions supposedly dedicated to critical inquiry are anxious to court a regime which is by common acknowledgment suspicious of free inquiry beyond its control. Rarely is this contradiction questioned. Business is less than eager to jeopardize its chances in the "China market" in the name of human or political rights. There are suggestions of envy in praises of a "China model" that has "successfully" combined neoliberal economic policies with authoritarian politics and social policy.
(ibid.: 290)
A blatant example has to be the exiled blind Chinese civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng's accusation that he is being forced to leave New York University for "as early as last August and September, the Chinese Communists had already begun to apply great, unrelenting pressure on New York University, so much so that after we [i.e. Chen and his wife and son] had been in the United States just three to four months, NYU was already starting to discuss our departure with us." 18 Despite N.Y.U.'s denial of the allegation and its law school's claim that the fellowship as that given to Chen was always to be for one year, it is probably difficult not to link the recent turn of event to the newly opened New York University Shanghai (NYU Shanghai), the first university jointly operated by China and the US, and part of a major initiative the NYU law school calls its Global Network University. 19
Conclusion
Many factors have contributed to the fascinating divergence of the domestic politico-governance trajectories of Taiwan and Mainland China. The unique international relations debacle in the 1970s had placed then-authoritarian KMT in a no-way-out situation, which reinforced and accentuated what Lucian Pye referred to as the "crisis of authoritarianism" (Pye, 1990) leading to a governance crisis of unprecedented proportion with the composite problems of delegitimation of authoritarian rule and the worsening international recognition of the island state's sovereignty. The latter, being inextricable from KMT's insisted legitimate rule over the long-lost Mainland China, had made salvaging what was left in the island state's international support a critical priority, especially that came from the US congress that was still reeling from the political fallout of the Chen Wen-cheng 陳文成 and Henry Liu 劉宜良 (Chiang Nan 江南) murder cases, and rendered the dismantling of political authoritarianism a less unattractive option to pursue and hence strengthened the hands of the reformist-pragmatist faction within the ruling regime. On the contrary, probably other than a very brief moment immediately after the 1989 Beijing massacre, the ruling CCP regime of Mainland China had not been placed on the horns of such a dilemma. The path towards a multi-party competitive electoral liberal democracy as envisaged by many has seemed increasingly forlorn as the CCP regime in the post-June Fourth era admirably led the country to economic miracle and hence, in the eyes of many, has successfully reasserted its legitimacy. 20 Describing China as "doubtless a posttotalitarian regime ruled by a ruthless Party", Jean-Philippe Béja ruminated in 2009 on the 20th anniversary of the Beijing massacre:
Twenty years after the 4 June 1989 massacre, the CCP seems to have reinforced its legitimacy. It has not followed the communist regimes of the Soviet bloc into oblivion. Its policies of elite cooptation, subtle response to social contradictions, and instrumental support for the "rule of law" have become major complements to its continued control over the press and the political system. It has made concessions to prevent discontent from crystallizing into social movements that might challenge its rule, and it has sent in the police to silence dissidents. Over the course of the same two decades, the opposition has had to wrestle with the trauma of the June 4 Massacre and the huge difficulties that it has raised for anyone who would challenge the CCP's primacy. Béja (2009: 14-15) Riding on the accolades of high prosperity, and with the carrot-andstick approach to maintain its survival, the once-brutal-dictatorship-turnedbenevolent-dictablanda (à la O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) has managed to preserve the status quo of its own rule as well as the interests of the "other power-holders" (Stinchcombe, 1968: 150) domestic and abroad by both selling the credit it claimed on behalf the industrious, enterprising and persevering masses as well as extracting the support of these "other powerholders" who are willing to abdicate their claims and principles in exchange for other kinds of protection and advantages by the ensuing strong State run by the present regime (Stepan, 1985) , in a faute de mieux deal much akin to Karl Marx's description of the Bonapartist regime in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852). Marx's classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy rests mainly in the sharing of common interests between the State and the dominant group, which extending into the international context in the case of contemporary China, between the ruling CCP regime and the dominant social élite and groups and the international community -which played such an important role in exerting pressure on the KMT regime in the 1970s-80s in bringing about Taiwan's democratic breakthrough -whose inability to overcome not only the present Mainland Chinese State's monopoly of violence to force a regime change but tacit condoning of political repression in their enthusiasm for the authoritarian "China model" and the lucrative China market (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 285) has given the PartyState the opportunity to use the leverage gained both to preserve the status quo and to propound its claim as the protector of stability and prosperity in exchange for the acceptance of its legitimacy, for even when "a government's use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that the government's other services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence" (Tilly, 1985: 172) . On this note, the present paper ends with a stylized presentation in Figure 3 , juxtaposing Taiwan's political institutional change -from her authoritarian regime amidst miraculous economic tour de force, through the years of the Lei Chen Incident (1960), Kaohsiung/Formosa Incident (高雄/美麗島事件, 1979), Lin Yi-hsiung 林義雄 family massacre (林宅血案, 1980) , the scandalous cases of Chen Wen-cheng's and Henry Liu's murder (1981 Liu's murder ( /1984 , to the national crisis of losing her seat at the United Nations (1971), followed by US's derecognition (1979) , and finally the ending of White Terror (long maintained since the 228 massacre in 1947) by the end of 1987 and the democratic breakthroughs in 1986, 1989 and 1996 -with that of Mainland China which markedly avoided a transformative change at the critical juncture of the hot crisis of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and chose a path to overcome the crisis with a massacre and continue to maintain her authoritarian one-party governance model supported by continuing relentless suppression of political dissent.
Based on the schema of Reeler's threefold theory of social change (Reeler, 2007) , wherein beneath the projectable changes which "through projects, tend to succeed where problems, needs and possibilities are more visible, under relatively stable conditions and relationships, which are not fraught with crisis or stuckness" (ibid.: 13) lurk the overt and subliminal or latent emergent changes (Reeler's more and less conscious varieties of emergent changes) that represent "the day-to-day unfolding of life, adaptive and uneven processes of unconscious and conscious learning from experience and the change that results from that [which] applies to individuals, families, communities, organisations and societies adjusting to shifting realities" (ibid.: 9), Figure 3 shows that one does not need to look too far back in contemporary Chinese history to see how a crisis of mammoth proportions could bring a nation to a bifurcation into wholesale transformative change and its antithesis in the form of a protracted cold stuckness. Transformative change, unlike emergent change that is characterized as a learning process, involves instead unlearning, a liberation "from those relationships and identities, inner and outer, which underpin the crisis and hold back resolution and further healthy development" (ibid.: 11-12). On the contrary, a cold stuckness, under a façade of economic prosperity and social harmony, could continue to hide the real need for change which in turn when revealed could provoke even stronger resistance to a real transformative change as the latter requires the unlearning of entrenched ideas and values in making way for the acceptance of new ones. It is a difficult choice as a crisis and stuckness of this nature tend to involve deep and complex histories and dynamics and represent the product of "tense or contradictory relationships […] prompted by shifts in external political, economic, cultural or environmental contexts" (ibid.). A particular choice at the moment of crisis could thus lead to protracted cold stuckness instead of a U-process of transformative change -CCP's holding on to one-party authoritarianism vis-à-vis KMT's daring plunge into "bestcase" democratization (Rigger, 2004) ) -thus heightening internal social contradictions leading to deteriorating sociopolitical and sociocultural anomie and neurosis resulted from the contradictions engendered by the interplay of State-led projected change and the suppressed but unstoppable overt and subliminal emergent changes.
Mainland China has come a long way, difficult and laudable, culminating in the country claiming to have superseded Japan to become the world's second largest economy. Going back to the critical juncture of 1989, that year's student movement which snowballed into social protests of unprecedented scale is in many ways a return of May Fourth. While May Fourth of 1919 had eventually led to the triumph of Maoism-Leninism which in a way hijacked the early socialism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 (Chen Duxiu), the Beijing tragedy of 1989 -the same year of a democratic breakthrough on the island state across the Taiwan Strait -represented a prelude to the subsequent hijacking of the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang administration's initiative for politico-economic liberalization by the strengthening one-party authoritarian State corporatism preferred by Deng Xiaoping who once and again felt wary of and threatened by his protégés' "bourgeois liberalization". The conservative backlash has since complicated the uneasy coexistence of a highly decentralized economic structure brought through the no-holdsbarred market economic reform with a highly centralized illiberal political regime or a proto-dictablanda. "Left alone, crises do get unconsciously resolved over time, tragically or happily or somewhere in-between", observed Reeler (2007: 12) , "But they can also be more consciously and proactively resolved through well led or facilitated transformative change processes." The resolution of Mainland China's 1989 crisis in a tragedy and the purge of the political reformists in a way shut down the transformative change wing of the bifurcation facing the CCP at that time and led to the protracted cold stuckness in sociopolitical modernization and its uneasy coexistence with accelerated market reform that brought national economic prosperity. Given the comparisons and contrasts between Taiwan and Mainland China that have been discussed in this paper with regard to domestic and external factors that affect the timeline of democratization, using Taiwan's unique experience to project Mainland China's democratic transition could be impractical. And yet, the long-term effect of overt and subliminal emergent changes -small accumulative changes at the margins which "can affect each other in barely noticeable ways and add up to significant systemic patterns and changes over time" (Reeler, 2007: 9-10 ) that tend to confound the State's best-laid plansshould never be overlooked, whether these should involve a seemingly forlorn effort at organizing an effective opposition (Lei Chen; Xie Changfa 谢长发) or a murder or suspicious death (Chen Wen-cheng; Li Wangyang) or whether the often heart-rending individual tragedies resulted from State oppression and injustice could soon serve as a galvanizing factor for democratization, as the concrete results from the rippling effects of such emergent changes might take time to actualize, and such changes are by nature "paradoxical, where perceptions, feelings and intentions are as powerful as the facts they engage with" (ibid.). exclusively apply to the case of China; before Taiwan's shift to democracy, her leaders had also taken steps to use modernization to maintain their power in those changing times. In 1969, then-President Chiang Kai-Shek had appointed his son, then-Vice-Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, to the seat of chairman in the important economic planning agency of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD). This move was apparently meant to identify Chiang Ching-kuo with Taiwan's "economic miracle", for with this appointment, Chiang Ching-kuo would preside over "the Governor of the Central Bank, the ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs, Communications, and others concerned with fiscal affair" (Plummer, 1970: 20) . Furthermore, after Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the throne in the wake of his father's demise, his governmental reforms, while beneficial to the economy and transition to democracy, had the added advantage of maintaining popular support for the KMT, as the party was, in this fashion, associated with the favourable changes sweeping over the country. However, for Taiwan, modernization eventually weakened the KMT's authoritarianism more than it strengthened it, and so less attention has been paid to these details. 11. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 23 . 12. This is not to say that academics should not continue attempting to make predictions based on these theories. For a thoughtful article on this subject, please refer to Bruce Gilley's "Should We Try to Predict Transitions to Democracy? Lessons for China" (2005). 13. Li died in 2012 under suspicious circumstances after enduring long years of beating and torture in jail since being arrested on 9th June 1989 immediately after the Beijing massacre and jailed for 13 years for "anti-revolutionary propaganda and instigation" and released on 8th June 2000 blind and deaf and in extremely poor health, but was soon jailed again in 2001 for 10 years for "subverting government institution" and under continued surveillance upon release in May 2011. 14. The Pinnacle Islands -a group of uninhabited islands currently controlled by Japan who calls them the Senkaku Islands 尖閣諸島, a part of Okinawa prefecture 沖縄県, but claimed by both the governments of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China as the Tiaoyutai/Diaoyutai Islands 釣魚台列 嶼/钓鱼台群岛, part of the Taiwan province. The largest island of the group is the Uotsuri Jima 魚釣島 / Diaoyu Dao 釣魚島. 15. Jacobs (1973) , Tien (1989) , Chu (1992) , Chao and Myers (1998) and Roy (2003) , summarized in Ooi (2009).
Notes
16. "Not only is Peking a nightmare streetscape awash in atrocity and anguish; the nation at large has become a haunted land. This howling, lurching mega-ghost is the Chinese Communist Party. In one staggeringly brutal stroke, it shot itself through the heart. It will not recover. A regime that professes itself to be the distillation of popular will has turned on the Chinese people, committing the ultimate sacrilege of eating its own children. Hundreds of China's brightest, most idealistic sons and daughters, their movement commanding wide public sympathy, were nakedly sacrificed to the cause of preserving an élite. See, e.g. Bo (2010) . In an interesting attempt at refutation of Minxin Pei's (2006) claim of CCP's illegitimacy, Bo set out to repudiate point by point Pei's arguments which were based upon a series of international indexes which the former listed in details: "China is one of the most authoritarian political systems in the world according to the Polity IV Project, is almost completely 'unfree' according to the Freedom House; and is one of the most corrupt countries according to Transparency International. China was ranked in the bottom third of the eighty countries surveyed in terms of 'quality of governance ranking' according to one group of the World Bank and was considered a weak state according to another group of the World Bank. China found itself next to the legion of failed states and most repressive countries in terms of 'voice and accountability' and also in the company of weak states such as Nicaragua, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Egypt, and Mali in terms of 'regulatory quality'. China was no better than Namibia, Croatia, Kuwait, and Mexico in terms of 'government effectiveness', was comparable to Belarus, Mexico, Tunisia, and Cuba in terms of 'political stability', and was in the company of Mexico, Madagascar, and Lebanon in terms of 'rule of law'." (Bo, 2010 : 102-103, citing Pei, 2006 
